The first self-stabilizing algorithm [1] assumed the existence of a central daemon, that activates one processor at time to change state as a function of its own state and the state of a neighbor. Subsequent research has reconsidered this algorithm without the assumption of a central daemon, and under different forms of communication, such as the model of link registers. In all of these investigations, one common feature is the atomicity of communication, whether by shared variables or read/write registers. This paper weakens the atomicity assumptions for the communication model, proposing versions of [1] that tolerate various weaker forms of atomicity. First, a solution for the case of regular registers is presented. Then the case of safe registers is considered, with both negative and positive results presented. The paper also presents an implementation of [1] based on registers that have probabilistically correct behavior, which requires a notion of weak stabilization.
Introduction
The self-stabilization concept is not tied to particular system settings. Our work considers several new system settings and demonstrates the applicability of the self-stabilization paradigm to these systems. In particular, we investigate systems with regular and safe registers and present modifications of Dijkstra's first self-stabilizing algorithm [1] that stabilizes in these systems.
The solution for the regular registers case use a special label in between writes of labels. In the case of safe registers we prove impossibility results, for the cases in which neighboring processors use a single safe register to communicate between themselves -where the register is/isn't divided to multiple fields. In the positive side, we define a composite safe register that roughly speaking ensures that reads return at most one corrupted field and design an algorithm for that case. Then we allow the processors to read the value written in their registers (therefore avoiding extra writes for refreshes). We present two algorithms for the above case, one that uses unary encoding and another that is based on Gray code.
Then we introduce randomized registers that, roughly speaking, return the "correct value" with probability p. It is impossible to ensure closure in such a system, since all reads may return incorrect values. We introduce the notion of weak self-stabilization for such systems. We use Markov chains to compute the ratio between the number of safe configurations and unsafe configurations in an infinite execution.
Markov chains associate each state (system configuration) with a probability to be in this state during an infinite execution. The fixed probability of the state is a "stabilizing" value. It is clear that the probability is either zero or one in the first configuration. Given the probability of transitions between configurations, one can compute the stable probability in an infinite execution, which is typically greater than zero and less than one. We found the definition of weak stabilization and the use of Markov chains to be an interesting and promising way for extending the applicability of the self-stabilizing concept.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe a solution for regular registers. Then in Section 3 we present impossibility results and algorithms for different settings of systems that use safe registers. Randomized registers and the use of Markov chains are presented in Section 4. Detailed proofs are omitted from this extended abstract.
Regular Registers
Before we introduce our results for the case of regular registers let us presents "folklore" results concerning read/write registers.
Read/Write Atomicity: It is known that n − 1 labels are sufficient for the convergence of Dijkstra algorithm assuming a central daemon, where n is the number of processors in the ring. We next prove that n − 2 labels are not sufficient.
Lower bound: Consider the case of n − 2 states in a system of n = 5 processors. Thus there are three possible processor states, which we label {0,1,2}. To prove impossibility we demonstrate a non-converging sequence of transitions (the key to constructing the sequence is to maintain all three types of labels in each system state, which violates the key assumption for the proof of convergence).
We now present a reduction (see [4] ) of a ring with 2n processors that is activated by a central daemon to a ring with n processors that assumes read write atomicity. We conclude that at least 2n − 1 states are required.
Each processor p j has an internal variable in which p j stores the value p j reads from p j−1 . Each read is a copy to an internal variable and each write is a copy of internal variable to a register. Thus, we have in fact a ring of 2n processors in a system with a central daemon. Hence, 2n − 1 states are required and are sufficient.
We now turn to design an algorithm for the case of regular registers. Informally, a regular register has the property that a read operation concurrent with a write operation can return either the "old" or "new" value. More formally, to define a regular register r we need to define the possible values that a read operation from r returns. Let x 0 be the value of the last write operation in r that ends prior to the beginning of the read operation (let x 0 be the initial value of r if no such write exists).
A read operation from a regular register r that is not executed concurrently with a write operation to r returns x 0 . A read operation from a regular register r that is executed concurrently with a write of a value x 1 returns either x 0 or x 1 . Note that more generally, a read concurrent with a sequence of write operations of the values x 1 , x 2 , · · · to r could return any x k , however once a read returns x k for k > 1, no subsequent read by the same reader will return x j for j < k − 1.
A naive implementation of Dijkstra's algorithm using regular registers may result in the following execution: To overcome the above difficulty we introduce a new value ⊥ that is written before any change of a value of a register. The algorithm for the case of regular registers appears in Figure 2 . In the figure, IR i is the input register for p i (thus IR i is the output register of p i−1 ). Variable x i contains the counter defined for Dijkstra's algorithm, and variable t i is introduced to emphasize the fine-grained atomicity of the model (one step reads a register, and the value it returns is tested in another step).
A safe configuration is a configuration in which all the registers have the same value, say x, and every read operation that has already started will return x. For simplicity we assume there are 2n + 1 states. Therefore, it is clear that a state is missing in the initial configuration, say the state y. Hence, when p 1 writes y, p 1 does not change its state before reading it from p n . p n can read y only when p n−1 has the state y. Any read operation of p n−1 that starts following the write operation that assigns y to p n−1 may return either ⊥ or y, which is effectively y (see lines 3 to 6 and 10 to 13 of the code). 
Safe Registers
Safe registers have the weakest properties of any in Lamport's hierarchy. A read concurrent with a write to a safe register can return any value in the register's domain, even if the value being written is already equal to what the register contains. There are two cases to consider for the model of safe registers. If a processor is unable to read the register(s) that it writes, we can show that Dijkstra's algorithm cannot be implemented. We initially consider the model of a single link register for each processor under the restriction that a writer is unable to read its output registers. Lemma 3.1 Dijkstra's algorithm cannot be implemented using only a single 1W1R safe register between p i and p i+1 .
Proof: Processor p i (i = 1) that copies from the output register of p i−1 must continually rewrite its output register for p i+1 -otherwise there can be a deadlock where the value written by p i is different from the value p i reads from p i−1 . Similarly, p 1 must repeatedly write, otherwise there can be a deadlock where all the registers have the same value, and the p 1 program counter is past the first write to its register that incremented this value. Therefore, processors continually write into their output registers. Since all processors repeatedly write their output registers, we can construct an execution where reads are concurrent with writes and obtain arbitrary values. This construction can be used to show that the protocol does not converge (and also that it is not stable).
Multiple fields safe register: The next result we present is impossibility for the case of multiple safe registers per processor, but where processors cannot read the registers they write. Suppose each processor p i has m safe registers to write, which p i+1 reads, and also p i reads m safe registers written by p i−1 . If a protocol allows a state in which a processor does not write any of its registers so long as its state does not change, then we may construct a deadlock because the local state of the processor differs from the encoding of values contained in its output registers. Therefore, in any implementation of the protocol, we can construct an execution fragment so that any chosen processor p i writes at least some of its registers t times, for arbitrary t > 0, and during the same execution fragment, p i−1 takes no steps. Moreover, if p i does not write to all m registers, then the registers it does not write can have arbitrary values inherited from the initial state. Therefore, p i+1 can read any value from p i , since at each step of p i+1 reading one of the m registers written by p i , we can construct an execution in which p i is concurrently writing to the same safe register. Because p i+1 can read any value, it is possible that for i = n that p i+1 reads a value equal to its own current value, which for Dijkstra's algorithm, means that p i+1 will maintain its current value rather than changing it; for the case i = n, there is an execution where each time p 1 reads its input registers, the value read differs from its own value, and again p 1 makes no change to its current value. These situations can repeat indefinitely with no processor entering the critical section.
Composite safe register: Next we sketch a solution in which fields of the registers can be written and the entire register is read at once. We call such a register composite safe register. A read from a composite safe register may return an arbitrary value for at most one of the register fields, a field in which a write is executed concurrently to the read 1 . We note that there is a natural extension of our algorithm in which at most k fields of a register may return an arbitrary value.
Each bit of the label value is stored in three 1-bit safe registers (three fields). This will ensure that a read during a refresh operation will return the value of the register. Assume that the value 101 is stored in nine 1-bit safe registers as 111000111. Assume further that a processor refreshes the value written in these registers each time writing in one of the 1-bit safe registers. A read operation returns the value of the entire composite safe register in which at most one bit is wrong. The Hamming distance ensures that the original value of the label bit can be determined.
To allow a value change we add a three bits guard value. Hence, the composite safe register has three bits that function as a guard value and 3 × 2(n + 1) bits for the label.
A processor p i , i = 1, that reads a new value from p i−1 first sets the guard value to 0 (writing 000 in the guard bits), and then changes the value of the label. p i writes 111 to its guard bits once p i finishes updating the label.
A processor p i that reads a guard value 0 does not use the value read. When p i reads a guard value 1 it examines the value it read.
The correctness proof starts in convincing ourselves that after the first time a processor p i refreshes (or writes a new value in) its register any read operation from its register (that returns a value) results in the last value written to this register. p 1 eventually writes a non existing label, this label cleans the system. More details are omitted from this extended abstract.
Safe registers with reads instead of refreshes: Given the above impossibility results, we examine settings where a processor can read the contents of the registers in which it writes. Consider 2n + 1 single bit, safe, 1W2R registers rather than a single register per processor. Each processor maintains a counter with domain [1, 2n + 1] for Dijkstra's algorithm. Unary encoding represents this counter: for a counter value k, the proper encoding is to write all registers 0 except for the register with index k, which has value 1. A legitimate configuration for this protocol is that each register vector represents the processor's last counter value (it differs only when a processor updates its counter) and counters correspond to Dijkstra's algorithm. Figure 3 is a self-stabilizing implementation of Dijkstra's algorithm.
Lemma 3.2
Proof: There are two proof obligations, stability (closure) from legitimate configurations and convergence from arbitrary configurations to legitimate ones.
Closure. It is straightforward to verify that in any processor cycle from a legitimate configuration, a processor writes to at most two registers as it changes the counter value. Thus when the neighbor reads these registers, at most two reads can have incorrect values due to concurrent writing. If both have correct values, the token passes correctly (a subsequent read by the process can still obtain an incorrect value, but only by getting 0 for all reads, which causes no harm). If both have incorrect values, then the reader observes no change in counter values. If just one returns an incorrect value, then the reader observes parity of zero, which is harmless. This reasoning shows that the protocol is stable.
Convergence. The remaining task is to verify that the protocol guarantees to reach a legitimate configuration in any execution. Suppose all processors have completed at least one cycle of statements 1-11. In the subsequent execution, a processor only writes a register if that register requires change to agree with the processor's counter. Note that by standard arguments, no deadlock is possible in this system and that p 1 increments its counter infinitely many times in an execution. It is still possible that one processor can read more than two incorrect values due to concurrent writes (consider an initial state with many counter values; as these values are propagated to some p i , it could be that p i+1 happens to read many registers concurrent with p i writing to them). Since the counter range is [1, 2n + 1] and there are n processors, it follows that at least one counter value t is not present in the system. By the arguments given for the proof of closure, no processor incorrectly reads input registers to get the value t in such a configuration. Because p 1 increments x 1 infinitely, we can suppose x 1 = t but no other processor or register encoding equals t, and by standard arguments (and the propagation of values observed in the proof of closure), a legitimate configuration eventually is reached.
The protocol of Figure 3 uses an expensive encoding of counter values, requiring 2n + 1 separate registers. The argument for closure shows that changing a counter and transmitting it is effectively an atomic transfer of the value -once the new value is observed, then any subsequent read of the registers either returns the new value or some invalid value (where the sum of bits does not equal 1), which is ignored. Note that this technique is not a general implementation of an atomic register from safe registers; it is specific to the implementation of Dijkstra's algorithm.
Can we do better than using 2n + 1 registers? The following protocol uses the Gray code representation of the counter, plus a extra bit for parity. The number of registers per processor is m + 1 where m = ⌈lg(2n + 1)⌉. Proof: The closure argument is the same as given in the proof of Lemma 3.2, inspecting each of the four cases of reading overlapping with writing of the two bits that change when a processor changes its counter and writes the one new Gray code bit and the parity bit. In each case, the neighbor processor either reads the old value, or ignores the values it reads (because parity is incorrect), or obtains the new counter value. The change from old to new counter value is essentially atomic.
Proof of convergence requires new arguments. Consider some configuration of an execution prior to which each processor has completed at least two cycles of statements 1-11 in Figure 4 , so that output registers agree with counter values (unless the processor has read a new value and updated its counter). Observe that thereafter, if processor p i successively reads two different Gray code values from its input registers, each with correct parity, then p i−1 concurrently wrote at least once to its output registers. Moreover, if p i successively reads k different Gray code values with correct parity, then p i+1 wrote at least k times a new counter value and read at least k − 1 times from its own input registers, by the structure of the loop (statements 1-11) in Figure 4 . A consequence of these observations is that if p 1 successively reads k different counter values with correct parity, then p n−k wrote at least one new counter value in the same period. In particular, if p 1 successively reads n + 2 different counter values, then we may assert that p 2 read p 1 's output registers and wrote a new counter in the same period. By the standard argument refuting deadlock, processor p 1 increments its counter infinitely often in any execution. Therefore we can consider an execution suffix starting with x 1 = 0. In the typical reflected Gray code, the high-order bit starting from x 1 = 0 does not change until the counter has incremented 2 m times. Therefore, until p 1 has incremented x 1 at least 2 m times, any read by p 2 obtains a value with zero in the high-order bit. The observations above imply that, before x 1 changes at the high-order bit, each processor has copied some counter value obtained via p 1 -such counter values may be inaccurate due to reads overlapping writes or more than one write (bit change) for one scan of a set of registers, however the value for the high-order bit stabilizes to zero in this execution fragment. In a configuration where no counter or register set has 1 in the high-order bit, the event of p 1 changing the high-order bit creates a unique occurrence of 1 in that position. Since p 1 does not again change its counter until observing the same value from p n , convergence is guaranteed.
Randomized State Reads and Weak Stabilization
Consider a system with a fair central daemon, in any given configuration the daemon activates each of the processors with equal probability. A system is weakly stabilizing if, in any execution, the probability that the system remains in any set of illegitimate configurations is zero. This definition implies that a weakly stabilizing system has the property that its state is infinitely often legitimate. In addition, one can sum up the probabilities for being in a legitimate state and use this value to compare algorithms.
To apply the definition of weak stabilization, we model register behavior probabilistically: a processor that makes a transition may "read" an incorrect value and therefore make an errant transition. We use Markov chains to analyze the percentage of the execution in which the system will not be in a safe configuration. See [5] for a description of Markov chains.
We continue describing our approach using a system of three processors and two states. The transitions and probabilities of the system appear in Figure 5 .
A read of a neighboring state returns with probability p > 1/2 the correct value. Each configuration has four outgoing arrows, one arrow for each state change of a processor, and one for staying in the same state. There are two possibilities for a state transition of a processor, one when the read returns the correct value (probability p) and one when the read returns a wrong value (probability 1 − p). Since the daemon chooses to activate each processor with equal probability, we have to use a factor 1/3 for the above probabilities.
We now choose specific values for p and compute powers of the probability matrix P, such that the matrix in power i and i + 1 are equal (P i = P i+1 ). Then we conclude the percentage of being in a legal configuration (not in the configurations 010 or 101). The following table shows different values for p (1, 3/4, 1/2, 1/4) and the corresponding equilibrium vector E T ; two figures display the transition matrix P for the cases of p = 1 and p = 3/4. The vectors show that the equilibrium probability for illegitimate configurations is zero for the deterministic case, then increasing as p reduces. Clearly, we can investigate the behavior of other systems with a range of probabilities, using the same approach. The results can assist us in comparing different system designs. 
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